Battle of Britain diary

[stona]

Men like Bader find their vocation in war. He was a difficult man and had many failings, but he was unquestionably a great pilot who had immense personal courage. You want men like that fighting on your side in a war. You might not want to work for them, or have them working for you, in peace time.
I would agree that his chances of surviving the war, had he not fallen victim to 'friendly fire' in August '41, were probably even slimmer than those of some of his contemporaries who did survive. His bravery would probably have got him killed.

[AlanG]

Friendly fire that may have been on purpose lol

[Tim Marlow]

I must admit I wonder about “courage” in that context. We visualise his exploits from our own perspective, and as a consequence are completely unable to understand how he did what he did. He was maxed out in Arrogance and Self confidence as personal characteristics. His imagination was also quite limited, considering his single minded viewpoint and disregard of other ideas but his own. Combining these traits with natural aggression it may well be that he simply could not conceive of his own fallibility so never suffered fear in the conventional sense like the majority of the population. I agree that these are absolutely invaluable characteristics in a combat situation, however, they are not desirable aspects of a strategic thinkers personality. In effect, he should have been forcefully told “go here and do this” rather than asked “where do we go and what do we do”.....

[stona]

I once heard Bader asked if he was ever afraid in his cockpit. He answered with words to the effect that if fear felt like an icy hand gripping the heart, then he was afraid. I think the point is that his arrogant self confidence, determination, and all the other factors you mentioned enabled him to overcome this. A brave man and a fool are not the same thing and whatever else I may think of Bader, he was a brave man.

He was certainly no strategic thinker. He simply did not understand how Britain's air defence system worked in 1940. It is a downside of his admirable fighting qualities that he, a S/Ldr appointed in June 1940, should presume to know better than the two men who had been the principle architects of Fighter Command, and who were themselves masters of both tactical and strategic matters. It is something that in the words of Jack Dixon amounts to 'a manifestation of arrogance that boggles the mind'.

Bader's Wing, blundering about in another Group's airspace and uncontactable by that Group's controllers was most often less of a help and more of a hindrance. At least two 11 Group pilots are on the record saying it was a miracle that it was never attacked by mistake. Park bent over backwards to facilitate the Big Wing, suggesting ways of overcoming exactly that problem, but was rebuffed. The relationship between Bader and senior 12 Group controller A B Woodhall was inverted too, not only did Woodhall not control his squadrons in accordance with Fighter Command policy, he was himself controlled by Bader.

Bader had a lot in common with Galland, a man who did not think wireless or any sort of ground control was necessary at all. In 1940 Galland was still arguing that a pre-sortie briefing and wing signals were adequate communications for fighters. Galland was another who was always right and struggled to see an alternate point of view. No wonder they got on so well after the war.

[minitnkr]

Right on Steve. PaulE

[Guest]

Wonder how Bader would have got on in charge of a Lancaster. perhaps a Guy Gibson.

Or as a Captain Johnnie Walker in charge of the Black Swan type anti submarine support group.

Or one of Stirling's Commanders in the SAS.

Or perhaps as Montgomery's trusted support officer. Major-General Sir Francis Wilfred "Freddie" de Guingand,

Probably none of them as I am certain he was a loner.

Great subject for speculation. Suspect none of the above. Most talented people fit into the part which in life suits them. If they do not they will never make the grade.

[stona]

Friday 20 September

Generally fair weather but with some showers.

The invasion may have been postponed, but the Germans still held a faint hope that air power alone might force the British to negotiate.

Today Goering issued directives which reflected a fundamental change in Luftwaffe strategy.

1. From now on, major attacks in daylight will only be carried out by small formations of bombers, not more than the size one Gruppe, escorted by strong formations of fighters and Zerstorer units.

2. Individual bomber crews shall carry out nuisance raids using clouds as protection from fighter attacks. The targets of these nuisance raids are London and industrial targets in other cities.

3. The bomber war on England is to be mainly shifted to the hours of darkness.

The German bombers would concentrate their efforts by night, but the German fighters would operate in force during the day. All Jagdgeschwaders under Jafu 2 took off between 10.45 and 11.15 and headed across the Channel. British RDF was incapable of distinguishing the type of aircraft that made up a raid and the Observer Corps also struggled, particularly when there was a haze and when the raids came in at higher altitudes, as the fighter sweeps generally did. Initially Park ordered 15 squadrons to readiness, but when reports seemed to confirm that there were few or no bombers present, most were stood down and those airborne were ordered to land. As they started to return to their bases the 22 fighter-bombers from II.(S)/LG 2 appeared over London and each dropped a 250-kg bomb on the city. Several squadrons were now ordered to climb and intercept the ‘bombers’, putting them in a very disadvantageous tactical position relative to the much higher Bf 109s. Nos 92 and 72 Squadrons engaged the first wave over Ashford before Nos 41 and 222 Squadrons were bounced by the second wave of Bf 109s. 7 spitfires were shot down, with 4 pilots killed for the loss of just 2 Bf 109s. No 253 Squadron was also bounced south of London, losing 3 of its Hurricanes, the pilots were all lucky to survive.

The tactical situation had changed. As bomber escorts the Bf 109 was shorn of a degree of tactical freedom, and the need to weave over the bombers reduced its already limited endurance. They also operated at altitudes at which they had no significant advantage over the Hurricane and where the Spitfire held an advantage. The Spitfire I’s best performance was from 15,000 to 25,000 feet, fastest at about 20,000 feet, where it was significantly faster than a Bf 109 E. This was also exactly where they had been meeting Bf 109s escorting bombers which flew at about 15,000 feet. Even so, the Bf 109 had been a formidable opponent. Now they operated freely at much higher altitudes, up to 30,000 feet, where they held a very substantial advantage over the Hurricane and where it was a close call with the Spitfire. Above 25,000 feet a Bf 109 running its DB 601 with 1.33 ata boost was faster than a Spitfire I with its maximum allowable +12 lbs boost. They were much more dangerous to Fighter Command’s pilots.

The RAF had lost 7 of its fighters to enemy action today, with another 4 damaged. The Luftwaffe had lost 11 aircraft, of which just 3 were fighters, with a further 5 damaged.

Tonight, the Luftwaffe concentrated its efforts on London which was widely bombed. 109 bombers dropped 154 tons of bombs, causing widespread damage. A Ju 88 of 4./KG 54 suffered some kind of failure causing the pilot to lose control. The flight engineer, Fw Wilhelm Schlake was the only one to escape the aircraft before it fell on Nos 2 and 4 Richmond Avenue, Merton, Surrey. The houses were completely destroyed.



The three remaining crewmen were all killed but the residents of the houses were sleeping in their Anderson shelters and escaped unharmed. The site was not redeveloped until the 1950s and until then remained a sight familiar to some of the more senior readers of this diary . During the war the site was used for a static water supply tank for use by Auxiliary Fire Service pumps.

The British noted that the bombers approached from further east, over Suffolk and Essex, rather than over Kent and Sussex.

Bomber Command sent out 172 sorties tonight, once again the main effort was against the invasion ports where the invasion fleets were still concentrated.

[stona]

Saturday 21 September

A fine day with some cloud and very occasional showers.

Yesterday there had been a tacit admission that the Luftwaffe was not winning this campaign. This morning Major Trautloft, the commander of JG 54, met Generalmajor Kurt-Bertram von Doring, commanding Jafu 2. He would write in his diary that the general was

“…utterly pessimistic. He talks about high bomber losses during the repeated day operations. Von Doring is obviously depressed.”

Park also had to look at his tactics. Because of the difficulty in establishing the composition of enemy formations and his reluctance to commit his resources against fighters, which could do little damage, it was decided to form so called ‘Jim Crow’ flights. These were made up of experienced pilots who would serve as look outs, reporting on enemy formations whilst avoiding any kind of engagement. These were numbered 421 and 422 Flights. P/O Keith Lawrence was one of the pilots selected for this important duty.

“Our pilots had all fought in the Battle of Britain and our purpose was to fly singly or in pairs, reporting on the movement of ships or monitor the build up of Luftwaffe formations. I have always wondered whether this was a ruse by Churchill and Dowding to conceal the fact that ULTRA was intercepting and decoding Luftwaffe signals.”

It was not a ruse, these flights served as the advanced eyes of Fighter Command. Despite the introduction of these flights Park was forced to resort to wasteful and exhausting standing patrols as well. It was the only way to be sure of getting at least some of his fighters high enough to meet raids which were now arriving at heights above 25,000 feet.

This evening, Luftflotte 2 conducted a fighter sweep similar to the one the day before. A total of 175 Bf 109s flew high above the Channel. Park ordered up twenty squadrons, but most were warned that it was only Bf 109s and declined to engage. The only positive result for the Germans was that Major Galland shot down Pilot Officer Tom Sherrington from No 92 Squadron. Sherrington nursed down his smoking Spitfire and managed to perform an emergency landing near Hildenborough.

I accordance with the new orders lone bombers made attacks on targets across Britain. One Ju 88 made a low level raid on Brooklands, having followed the railway lines from Guildford. One of its bombs, a 250 Kg delayed action bomb landed on the main Hurricane assembly shop. In an act of considerable bravery Lt J M S Patton, a Canadian engineer, loaded the bomb onto a cobbled together sled and tipped it into an earlier bomb crater, where it later exploded harmlessly.

Fighter Command suffered no operational losses today. Sherrington’s Spitfire N3032 was the only aircraft damaged in action. The Luftwaffe lost 6 aircraft in operations against Britain.

Tonight 113 German bombers dropped 164 tons of bombs on London and a large number of fires were reported. Liverpool and Coventry both reported bombing.

Bomber Command sent 92 aircraft to attack the Channel ports. Its activity was more than an inconvenience to the Luftwaffe’s pilots, based close to the coast. Ulrich Steinhilper wrote to his mother,

“The British are slowly getting on our nerves; because of their persistent activity our AA guns are in virtually continuous use and so we can hardly close our eyes. But there is nothing else we can do about that other than curse. If they’d come in daylight there’d be a reckoning.”

[stona]

On reading the post above I will add as a separate post a little bit about ULTRA which was originally included.

First, I'll get this off my chest
There is some confusion about the role that ULTRA intelligence played in the Battle, because it is true that Dowding did not know of its existence until October 16th 1940 when he was added to the list of people that were made aware of Enigma's existence. Just because someone was not aware of the source of intelligence does not mean that they cannot act upon that intelligence when it is provided for them. Some very well regarded and important historians seem to have overlooked this most basic fact in their attempts to prove or disprove what Dowding may or may not have known in the summer of 1940. It is also important to understand that although the Luftwaffe's use of Enigma was the most unprofessional and prone to lazy operational expedients which severely compromised its security, it was never routinely read. Sometimes it took hours to decrypt a message into the probable plaintext, sometimes it took days, making it tactically useless, and often it wasn't broken at all.

So what sort of information was being provided to Fighter Command? ULTRA intelligence was used in the form of briefs to relevant commands. Of course, it was never identified as ULTRA, usually it was 'a reliable source' or some similar wording. Here is an example of such a brief.



Of course there were other sources of intelligence. It was radio intercepts and other signals intelligence that with other intelligence (like that from interrogations) allowed the RAF to build up a surprisingly accurate picture of the Luftwaffe's order of battle and even personnel.
If, for example, the British could establish that a number of 'Stuka' formations were moving to airfields along the French Channel coast, they could be reasonably sure they were not moving there for a holiday.

[stona]

Sunday 22 September

Dull with fog in the morning, clearing by the afternoon.

The autumn weather this morning prevented any significant flying from the Luftwaffe’s airfields in France.

Fighter Command flew just 158 sorties today, the lowest number since the Battle began on 10 July.

The Luftwaffe lost 1 Ju 88, a weather reconnaissance aircraft of 4(F)/121 which was shot down by Spitfires of No 234 Squadron. The Ju 88 ditched in the Channel and the crew were picked up by a trawler, becoming PoWs.

Fighter Command suffered no operational losses today.

Both air forces suffered aircraft lost and damaged in landing and take off accidents, certainly a reflection of the poor weather and marginal flying conditions.

The Luftwaffe was back over London tonight. Bombing was scattered but it was eastern and southern districts which were most heavily bombed. The Southern Railway’s infrastructure was hit once again and travel disrupted. Luton, Watford and Romford also reported bombing.

One of Churchill’s private secretaries was woken during the night with a message from Roosevelt expressing concern that an invasion was imminent. On recent nights Churchill had telephoned the Admiralty, checking weather conditions in the Channel but tonight it was not considered worth waking the Prime Minister.

Bomber Command sent 95 of its bombers to the Channel ports, all of which were bombed. 27 barges were destroyed in a raid against the port of Ostend, while four smaller boats were sunk in Boulogne’s harbour and eight barges were destroyed in Calais. On the adjacent Marck airfield a Bf 109 from I.(J)/LG 2 was damaged, which was a bonus for an errant bomb load.

Berlin was bombed again. At Luneburgerstrasse 27 in the district of Moabit, nine people were killed and fourteen wounded by a direct hit in an air-raid shelter. American reporter William Shirer commented on the air raid on Berlin in his diary,

“After a week’s absence the British bombers came over last night and kept the populace in their cellars for two hours and twenty minutes in the middle of the night. This was a little shock for most people, for they had been told all week that for several nights the British had been trying to get through but had always been turned back by the anti-aircraft defences.”

[stona]

Monday 23 September

Generally fine weather across the UK

The day dawned bright and fine, not what the men of Fighter Command wanted to see. The Battle did not end on Battle of Britain day. With hindsight we know that it had been the decisive day as far as any chance of an invasion in 1940 was concerned, but the fighting continued. The improvement in the weather today allowed for more flying.

By 09.00 a large build up of enemy aircraft was seen by RDF over the Calais area. Park reacted in force, dispatching no less than 24 squadrons to meet the raid. The raid was made up entirely of fighters, more than 200 Bf 109s, which had quickly crossed the Channel, meaning that most of the British fighters did not have time to climb to the altitude at which the Germans arrived. Nos 92 and 72 Squadrons from Biggin Hill, both flying Spitfires were two of those that made the initial interception from an advantageous height. F/Lt Brian Kingcombe and P/O Drummond shot down one Bf 109 each. Oberfw Grzymalla, who baled out and Fw Kuepper, who force landed in a duck pond, both from to III./JG 26, ended up in British captivity. Next, the Spitfires from 41 Squadron attacked and shot down four Bf 109s from I.(J)/LG 2 (one of which staggered back to France, making an emergency landing at its own airfield) without any losses to themselves. Pilot Officer George ‘Ben’ Bennions, an ace from 41 Squadron with 11 victories, said,

“I eventually sighted enemy aircraft slightly below on our starboard side. I ordered line astern and turned in to attack and a series of dogfights ensued in the course of which I succeeded in shooting down one Me 109 which landed on the sea N. of Dover; about one mile from the shore, and nosed in – the tail remained visible for approximately 3 minutes and had a yellow strip down the rudder at its extremity.”

This Bf 109 is often said to have been flown by a twenty-year old Fahnrich Hans-Joachim Marseille, who after 20 minutes in the cold water was rescued by an He 59. Another Bf 109 shot down today was that of Uffz Frederich Dilthey of JG 2, who crashed into the sea off Folkestone pier. I know that Folkestone is south and west of Dover, but there is a remarkable sequence of images taken of this event, one of which shows the Bf 109 feet above the waves with a Spitfire above. F/Lt Cosby and Sgt Glew of No 72 Squadron are credited with this victory, but some of the images exactly match Bennions’ description.



Anyway, you pays your money and you takes your pick. If Bennions didn’t shoot down Marseille, then obviously someone else did

The Hurricane squadrons did not do so well. No 73 Squadron had a bad start to the day when, according to the squadron diary.

“In spite of the bright sunny morning our spirits sagged – and our stomachs revolted – when we had our breakfast placed before us. It purported to be mince, but it gave us all many unpleasant thoughts and even the most hardened stomachs decided to go breakfastless. If our breakfast was bad, worse and infinitely more tragic hours awaited us…

While patrolling at 20,000 feet the Squadron was ordered to 10,000 feet. Smithy, who was leading, promptly and wisely questioned this, but the order was confirmed, so being left no option he began to go down. Disaster then came among us. At 12,000 feet when 17 Squadron had left the tail completely uncovered, Me109s and He113s hurtled down from the sun and the formations went over like nine pins.”

There were of course no ‘He 113s’, just the Bf 109s of JG 26, led by Adolf Galland. The squadron lost four of its Hurricanes. Sgt Maurice Leng and Sgt Frederick Perkin baled out and survived. P/O Neville Langham-Hobart ended up badly burned in the Thames Estuary near Lightship 93 and drifted around there until a boat spotted him; P/O Douglas Kinder was rescued from the Channel severely burned. No. 257 Squadron was also hit by JG 26. Sergeant Donald Aslin abandoned his Hurricane and was rescued, badly burned, from the Channel. He had arrived at the squadron the previous day. His Squadron Leader, Bob Stanford-Tuck returned to Debden in a dark mood. Two of the pilots in his Flight had simply turned and fled from the scene when the Bf 109s appeared, leaving Tuck and another pilot in the lurch

A remarkable fight took place between III./JG 3’s commander, Hauptmann Wilhelm Balthasar, the most successful German ace in the Battle of France and P/O Terence Kane, who had served in the RAF since July 1938, and now flew a Spitfire from 234 Squadron.

Kane chased Balthasar all the way to the French coast before the Luftwaffe expert finally turned the tables on him.

“Wait, my friend, I thought, you must return soon, and then I will be the hunter. Cap Gris Nez loomed up in front, and I skimmed over it one metre above. Suddenly the Tommy pulled up steeply and slowed down…. At once I turned my Me 109 and zoomed up in a tight bank, engine howling, straight at him. I fired one burst from close range, I nearly rammed him and the Spitfire went straight into the sea. He flew fantastically!”

Kane survived to become a PoW. He remembered rather more soberly,

“I turned the aircraft on its back, jettisoned the hood and started to climb out. Then I realised the radio unit and oxygen supply were still fastened to the plane and to me, so I climbed back in and unfastened them. The aircraft decided it didn’t like being on its back and went on its side, so I had to turn it on its back again and climb out. I reached for the parachute ripcord – and couldn’t find it. Panic began to set in. I was falling through cloud and at the very moment I got the chute open I broke cloud and there was the Channel 500 feet below. If I had been three seconds later pulling the ripcord I would not be here now. The Germans fished me out and I spent the rest of the War as a prisoner of war.”

Fighter Command also lost another ace, 152 Squadron’s Pilot Officer William Beaumont, who had a tally of seven victories. He set off to intercept a lone bomber and was shot down and killed. Beaumont was probably killed in combat with a Ju 88 flown by Leutnant Elmar Hauer from the reconnaissance unit 3.(F)/123, which was also recorded as missing over the English Channel.

Fighter Command and the Luftwaffe lost 11 fighters each in these exchanges. I./JG 54 had suffered further losses and would be withdrawn from the Channel. Its 3rd Staffel had been particularly badly mauled. The Geschwader Kommodore, Hannes Trauttoft would write.

“The 3. Staffel began its operations against England with 17 pilots. Since then, 15 of them have been killed, written off as missing, ended up in captivity or wounded.”

This was no way to win a battle.

Tonight 261 German bombers dropped 300 tons of bombs on London. The cities anti-aircraft artillery and Blenheim and Defiant night fighters did their best, but without success. Bombs fell mainly on southern and eastern districts of the capital. Bomber Command raided Berlin at the same time, for the second night in a row. This time 129 Whitleys, Wellingtons and Hampden bombers attacked seventeen targets in the German capital. 112 aircraft reported having bombed over a three hour period, three were lost, one of each type. The Channel ports were not ignored, 71 aircraft were sent to these targets.

[Guest]

The B Of B was a destructive affair. This was both in terms of lost homes factories etc.

But the worst side was the devastation received by Pilots Of Fighter Command & the crews of Bomber Command. Wounds burns especially to those area exposed facial & hands. The RAF employed a special man for the rehabilitation of those who suffered these awful moments.

A New Zealander. MacIndoe not well known publicly but certainly he was among pilots & crews.

Archibold Macindoe pioneered the specialist form of plastic surgery with his team he set up. He also was way ahead of his time in looking after the mental state of his patients. Rather than walking around in hospital gowns he told them to get into uniform & go for walks.

Near where I went to school in Chessington there was a rehabilitation centre. We saw many who MacIndoe had put on the road to a certain recovery
Amazing how life throws up these absolutely dedicated people. Their prime purpose to look after their fellow human beings

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Faces-fire-biography-Archibald-McIndoe/dp/B0000CLFUO

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[stona]

The Hurricane had a propensity for burning its pilots.

This is often attributed to the reserve/gravity petrol tank which was positioned in front of the pilot on his side of the engine firewall, literally the other side of his instrument panel, but if you read pilot accounts this was not the primary cause. The Hurricane had vulnerable petrol tanks, either side of the pilot in the inner wings, which were much more likely to be hit. They did not have an engine one side and the pilot's armour on the other and unlike the reserve tank, they had no protection at all. Once set on fire the flames from the fire were drawn into the cockpit AFTER the pilot slid the hood back to abandon the aircraft. The cockpit opening worked as a chimney, blasting the pilot with flames.

[stona]

Tuesday 24 September

Some cloud with haze in the Channel and Thames Estuary.

Today saw the beginning of a concentration of effort on the British aircraft industry. While London remained a target, the Germans had decided to attempt to cut off the seemingly limitless supply of replacement aircraft to the RAF.

Ju 88s from KG 77 made another attempt on London this morning. They would be escorted by almost 200 Bf 109s, from JG 2, JG 26, JG 54, I./JG 77 and I.(J)/LG 2. British RDF detected the formations shortly after 08.30 and Park responded with 11 of his squadrons. Only three of these squadrons, Nos 16, 605 and 17, managed to locate the German formations in the haze. They managed to damage three Ju 88s before they were driven off by the German fighter escort which shot down three British fighters. P/O Harold Bird-Wilson, a six victory ace of No 17 Squadron, was one of those shot down, probably by Adolf Galland.

“Ground control vectored our 17 Squadron to the Thames Estuary, but as we arrived we were attacked by a couple of Me 109s. Before I had time to make any evasive manoeuvres, my Hurricane shook under hits from cannon shells. The aircraft immediately was on fire. I only had time to shout “Mayday, Green 1 on fire”, and then the hot flames came into the cockpit. I baled out, landing in the Thames where I was rescued by an MTB of the Royal Navy. I was already scarred by the burns I got in a plane crash before the war, and now I was more burned. I also was injured by shrapnel from the German shells. I was brought to the hospital in Haywards Heath, where received the news that I had been awarded the DFC.”

At 11.00 the He 111s of KG 27 repeated the exercise, but this time the weather intervened. The bombers turned back but the fighters continued a ‘Freiejagd’ over southern England. Nos 41, 66 and 92 Squadrons made interceptions in the haze. The fighters weaved around each other but kept losing their opponents because of the poor visibility. One 41 Squadron Spitfire was shot down but Sgt E V Darling was unhurt.

The main attack of the day was carried out by Erprobungsgruppe 210 on the Supermarine works at Woolston. The works were divided into two main sections about half a mile apart. Both were on the eastern side of the River Itchen, the original Woolston works and a large assembly plant to the north, known as the Itchen works. The bomb carrying Bf 110s arrived so fast and so low that the air raid alarm sounded six minutes after they had bombed. One Supermarine worker recalled that the first warning they had was the noise of anti-aircraft guns engaging the raid. Running north-south adjacent to the Woolston and Itchen works was the Portsmouth-Southampton railway. Access to the air raid shelters was through an archway cut through the embankment. It caused an inevitable bottleneck as workers rushed to the shelters. The first bombs fell at 13.30, close to the factories and in surrounding residential areas. No significant damage was caused to the Supermarine works but one bomb fell directly on the archway, crowded with workers, killing 98 and injuring 42 of them. The unit had another go, three hours later with just three aircraft, but still could not hit the factory. Epgr 210 lost one Bf 110 shot down by anti-aircraft fire into the sea off Southampton. The crew of Lt von der Horst and Ogefr Ollers were both killed.

Wolfgang Schenk, then Gruppe Adjutant for Epgr 210, said of Horst,

“He was a wonderful boy, tall, large and friendly. He always thought he was going to be killed in action. A sad loss”.

The Luftwaffe lost 7 aircraft in operations against Britain today, with another 8 damaged. The RAF had lost 4 (plus two more in a training collision) with 5 damaged.

The Luftwaffe made a heavy raid on London tonight. As usual bombing was widespread, it was the West End which was most badly hit, causing disruption to services and transport links. The docks got away almost unscathed. Liverpool was bombed again.

Bomber Command dispatched 122 sorties tonight, 100 to the Channel ports. 20 aircraft went to bomb a power station in Berlin, they did at least bomb Berlin. The other two went to railway yards in Hamm. Two aircraft were lost.

[Guest]

Great work Steve. Thanks for info on barges.

Talking of barges ?

My Uncle Arthur dad's brother in Law. Dad & his sisters all Sunderland born & bred.

Uncle Arthur, a big burly man with a gravel voice, was skipper of a collier. Lovely character as I found in time.

Coals were picked up from the northeast coal fields & taken down to the Thames. There the colliers moored up at the numerous power stations on the Thames.
Great monuments. Passed, in my teen life, Battersea Power Station every day on my motor bike going to work. Those strong symbols of power. Those 4 huge chimneys sprouting out of each corner of the station. Each spewing out the remains of the coals.

So Uncle Arthur, during B of B with the continued night bombing after, joined convoys formed along the east coast line of Great Britain. Protected as much as possible by fighter squadrons. But some jerries got thro.

Uncle's collier was hit & sank. He survived not sure on his shipmates. Bizarre. His hair was black. Overnight the trauma turned his hair completely white.

Given another collier he continued for the rest of the war & afterwards. A true Brit.